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This study examines the effects of research and development (R&D) reporting method 
and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on R&D project continuation decisions. 
The current study employs an experiment with a 2x3 between-participants design, manipulating 
both R&D reporting method (expense vs. capitalize) and  knowledge of supervisor compensation 
(control group with no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. 
knowledge of restricted stock compensation). Using salient short-term incentives to motivate real 
earnings management, this study demonstrates that capitalization may result in managers 
foregoing economically efficient R&D investment opportunities. The results indicate that 
managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation structure has little influence on managers’ 
R&D project continuation choices. However, when managers capitalizing R&D expenditures had 
knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted (short-term) stock compensation their 
perceived personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. Participants who 
  
2 
 
capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor received restricted (long-
term) stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to please their supervisor 
significantly higher than all other participants. Additionally, participants with knowledge that 
their supervisors restricted stock compensation were significantly more concerned about the 
likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method. These 
findings contribute to the management accounting literature by providing new insights on the 
influence of knowledge of supervisor compensation on managerial decision making as well as 
additional insights into the factors that contribute to and limit real earnings management. This 
study also extends the literature on R&D by providing evidence of the potential for real earnings 
management when R&D expenditures are capitalized in the absence of personal responsibility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the issuance of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 2, there 
has been an ongoing discussion of the pros and cons of expensing versus capitalizing research 
and development (R&D) expenditures. One aspect of this debate centers on the opportunities for 
real earnings management (RM). RM is a type of earnings management that occurs when 
managers undertake actions that deviate from best practices to meet certain earnings thresholds 
(Roychowdhury 2006). The preponderance of prior research proposes that mandatory R&D 
expensing provides incentives for managers to underinvest in R&D as a means to increase 
reported earnings (Baber et al. 1991; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Gunny 2010; Roychowdhury 
2006). However, recent research suggests that R&D capitalization may also provide incentives 
for RM in the form of overinvestment in failing R&D projects (Seybert 2010).  More 
specifically, when R&D is capitalized, managers may delay discontinuing or overinvest in a 
failing project to avoid the negative reporting consequences of impairing the original project 
asset. The present study further investigates the potential for RM when R&D expenditures are 
capitalized. 
The Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.’s (ISS) most recent global survey on 
corporate governance proposes that executive compensation will be the most important 
governance topic for the upcoming year (ISS 2012). Further, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has been taking actions to address concerns about executive compensation 
for several years. In 2006, the SEC overhauled the old executive compensation disclosure rules. 
Item 402 of Regulation S-K was revised (effective December 2006) requiring public companies 
to increase and simplify executive compensation disclosures, among other things, to assist with 
shareholder understanding (SEC 2007). Notwithstanding these changes, concerns about 
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executive compensation practices at public companies continued and were addressed again in 
specific provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act) (Morrison and Foerster 2010).  More specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the 
SEC to come up with disclosure rules addressing the association between executive 
compensation and the company’s financial performance in addition to the proportion of the 
executives’ total compensation relative to the median compensation of all other employees 
(Deloitte 2012; SEC 2012).  
While additional information about executive compensation may provide shareholders 
with more clarity about how executives are compensated, an interesting question arises: Will 
knowledge of an executive’s compensation package impact the behavior or decisions of that 
individual’s subordinates? Taken together with R&D, it remains an open question as to how (or 
if) a firm’s R&D reporting method might interact with knowledge of a supervisor’s 
compensation package to impact certain managerial decisions, such as whether or not to continue 
a failing R&D project. To better understand the factors that may help managers make value 
maximizing R&D investment decisions, this study examines the impact of R&D reporting 
method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on R&D project continuation 
decisions.  
The current study employs an experiment with a 2x3 between-participants design, 
manipulating both R&D reporting method (expense vs. capitalize) and  knowledge of supervisor 
compensation (control group with no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock 
compensation vs. knowledge of restricted stock compensation). While prior research investigates 
reputation or project responsibility based motivations for RM under the capitalization reporting 
method (Seybert 2010), motivations related to performance-contingent incentives remain 
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unexplored. The current study addresses this gap in the literature by examining RM decisions in 
an experimental setting with salient performance-contingent incentives. Specifically, project 
continuation or RM is motivated by a short-term performance-contingent incentive. Short-term 
incentive structures have been linked to both real and discretionary accrual earnings management 
(Balsam 1998; Carter et al. 2009; Chow et al. 2000; Healy 1985; Ibrahim and Lloyd 2011). 
Participants in this study are asked to allocate R&D funds between two projects.  They 
may either allocate funds towards continuing an original failing project or towards developing a 
new alternative project. When R&D expenditures are expensed, the manager does not benefit 
from project continuation. Regardless of supervisor incentive horizon, it is expected that 
managers will be less likely to continue the project when R&D expenditures are expensed.  In 
contrast, when R&D expenditures are capitalized, the manager benefits from project 
continuation. An impairment loss would be triggered if the original project is discontinued 
prohibiting participants from receiving their current year bonus. It is predicted that RM will be 
dependent on the supervisor’s compensation package. Under capitalization, when managers have 
knowledge that their incentive horizon is aligned with that of their supervisor (i.e. both short-
term) altruism, other regarding preferences, moral disengagement theory, and attribution theory 
indicate that the presence of an additional beneficiary will create an additional motivation for 
managers to continue the original project or engage in RM. In contrast, when managers have 
knowledge that their incentive horizon is misaligned with that of their supervisor (i.e. the 
manager has a short-term horizon and the supervisor has a long-term horizon) accountability 
pressures and impression management can deter managers from engaging in RM. Therefore, it is 
anticipated that supervisor incentive horizon will moderate the relationship between R&D 
reporting method and managers’ willingness to continue with a failing project. 
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This study makes several valuable contributions. First, due to the magnitude of spending 
on R&D, research that can inform practice is important (Seybert 2010). For example, the U.S. is 
the worldwide leader in R&D spending and for the past three decades R&D spending accounted 
for approximately 2.5 percent of the gross domestic product (Bernanke 2011). In the past 35 
years, median R&D spending accelerated nearly twice as fast as average spending. Additionally, 
corporate R&D spending approximately doubles that of print and broadcast media advertising 
and is equivalent to roughly half of the amount spent on capital expenditures (Hirschey et al. 
2012). Observably, R&D is a significant expense for many companies (Oswald and Zarowin 
2007).  
Second, the increased use of R&D capitalization in the U.S. and worldwide suggests that 
the present study has the potential to inform regulators. Given the R&D reporting differences 
between U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), there is continued discussion regarding what method will ultimately 
be adopted upon the convergence of these standards. U.S. executives have expressed concerns 
over the significance of potentially changing R&D reporting methods. These executives rank the 
differences of accounting for R&D under U.S. GAAP and IFRS as an area that will require 
substantial effort for conversion and impact their companies’ financial statements (PwC 2011). It 
is important for regulators, executives, and investors to understand the economic differences and 
behavioral implications associated with these alternative R&D reporting methods as they prepare 
for the more widespread adoption of IFRS. 
Third, results of the present study may shed light on corporate practices that might be 
used to circumvent transparency in financial reporting. The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX 2002) significantly changed the financial reporting environment by providing greater 
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penalties for fraudulent financial reporting. However, Bartov and Cohen (2009, 508) warn that 
“investors and other capital market participants should pay more attention to real earnings 
management activities used to meet certain earnings targets than in the pre-SOX period”. These 
authors suggest that some companies may be using RM as a covert method for questionable 
financial reporting.  
When managers were asked to make an absolute decision to continue or discontinue the 
original project, as expected managers were more likely to continue the project when R&D 
expenditures were capitalized relative to expensed. One implication of this study is that even in 
the absence of personal responsibility, there is the potential for RM when R&D expenditures are 
capitalized. However, in the absence of an absolute choice the differential impact on project 
continuation between the two R&D reporting methods was less clear.  
The results of this study do not support the hypotheses that managerial knowledge of 
supervisor compensation structure influences R&D project continuation choices. However, 
analyses of the debriefing questions provide some meaningful insight into the potential 
psychological effects of knowledge of supervisor compensation in managerial decision making. 
Consistent with attribution theory, when decision makers who capitalized R&D expenditures had 
knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted stock compensation their perceived 
personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. As predicted by self-presentation 
theory, participants who capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor 
received restricted, long-term stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to 
please the CTO significantly higher than all other participants.  Additionally, participants with 
knowledge that their supervisors receive restricted stock compensation were significantly more 
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concerned about the likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting 
method. 
The remainder of this proposal is organized as follows. The next section identifies the 
appropriate literature for the study and develops the hypotheses. Section three describes the   
methodology for the study, which is followed by the results in Section four. Section V concludes 
by offering limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Real Earnings Management 
 
 Earnings management involves using accounting principles or making business decisions 
in such a way that allows the company to present itself in the best possible light.  RM occurs 
when a manager alters the operations of the firm in a way that is not consistent with normal or 
best business practices with the intent of meeting certain earnings thresholds (Roychowdhury 
2006). This is achieved by timing investment or financing decisions in a manner that 
intentionally alters reported earnings (Schipper 1989). These actions tend to be short sighted, 
generating a desired short-term gain or loss in exchange for lower future cash flows. Because 
RM directly affects cash flows in the current period, it may also be more costly to firms from a 
taxation perspective (Zang 2007). Therefore, unlike accruals-based earnings management, RM is 
often accompanied by a real cost to the firm in the form of decreased long-term firm value (e.g., 
Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Gunny 2010; Hunton et al. 2008).  
Although accruals-based earnings management may be less costly than giving up long-
term firm value, managers appear to prefer managing earnings through real activities over 
accrual manipulations (Graham et al. 2005). There are several potential explanations for why 
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managers may prefer RM techniques over accruals-based earnings management. Prior empirical 
evidence implies that accounting standards can influence how firms choose to manage earnings 
(Cohen et al. 2008; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Zang 2007). The majority of this research 
focuses on the substitution effect between accruals-based and RM. As accounting standards 
become more restrictive, discretion for manipulating accruals is reduced (Ewert and Wagenhofer 
2005). Thus, when managers have fewer permissible accounting alternatives available or less 
opportunities to manipulate accruals, they are likely to replace accruals-based earnings 
management with RM (Chi et al. 2011; Demski 2004; Drymiotes 2011; Ewert and Wagenhofer 
2005; Schipper 2003; Wang and D’Souza 2006).  
The substitution between accruals-based and RM is also likely to occur when regulatory 
or auditor scrutiny increases (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Demski 2004; Gunny 2010; Schipper 2003; 
Zang 2012).  RM tends to be less transparent and thus more difficult for shareholders, regulators, 
and auditors to detect (Cohen et al. 2008; Wang and D’Souza 2006). Both Cohen et al. (2008) 
and Bartov and Cohen (2009) find evidence consistent with an increase in RM in the periods 
following the passage of SOX. Similarly, while higher quality auditors are effective in curtailing 
accruals-based earnings management, such a situation is often accompanied by higher levels of 
RM (Chi et al. 2011).  
In addition to the passage of SOX, the recent global economic crisis and recession has 
challenged the U.S. financial regulatory system and auditing profession (Kothari and Lester 
2012). In response to the economic crisis, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) submitted several legislative reform recommendations to Congress, all of which 
support enhanced transparency in financial reporting (Melancon 2010). In addition to changing 
the accounting standards to provide greater transparency, any changes in accounting standards 
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should be accompanied by “greater enforcement, sound auditing practices, and commensurate 
regulatory vigilance (Kothari and Lester 2012, 350).” These authors suggest that such 
mechanisms will remain important as the U.S. standards continue to evolve through the 
convergence with IFRS. Further, the Dodd-Frank Act is working to improve transparency in the 
financial system (SEC 2012). In view of the fact that prior research indicates that increased 
regulatory and auditor scrutiny, and transparency, make accruals-based earnings management 
more difficult, it is likely that RM will continue to be the preferred method for managing 
earnings. 
There are a number of methods of RM that companies might choose, all of which impact 
earnings in current and future periods. Some of the choices might be to lower prices near the end 
of the year to move sales into the current year, to delay investments until a later period, to extend 
more lenient credit terms, to sell fixed assets, or to delay or overinvest in R&D projects. R&D 
expenditures have a material impact on earnings and stock returns for most companies engaged 
in R&D activities (Oswald and Zarowin 2007). Given the prevalence of RM and the potentially 
significant long-term economic consequences of managers’ R&D investment decisions, it is 
important to understand how R&D accounting methods influence managers’ use of RM 
techniques. 
R&D Reporting Method 
With the exception of certain software costs (SFAS No. 86, 1985), R&D capitalization is 
not permissible for U.S. firms. U.S. GAAP requires material R&D activities to be expensed and 
disclosed in the financial statements when incurred (SFAS No. 2, 1974; Codification Topic 730, 
2009). Since the release of SFAS No. 2, there has been an ongoing debate about whether the U.S. 
should revert back to capitalization (Oswald and Zarowin 2007). The recent convergence efforts 
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between the FASB and IASB, as well as the SEC’s acceptance of the use of IFRS without 
reconciliation from foreign filers, have reenergized this dialogue. Unlike U.S. GAAP, qualified 
development costs are permitted to be capitalized under IFRS (IAS 38, 2004). The ability to 
manage earnings through the use of real techniques also differs between these two standards, as 
discussed in the next section. The FASB continues to work with the IASB in an effort to 
converge to a single set of high quality, global accounting standards (FASB 2012). Given the 
R&D reporting differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, it is important to understand the 
economic differences and behavioral implications associated with these differing reporting 
methods as the discussion continues about what method will ultimately be adopted upon the 
convergence of these standards.   
Effects of R&D Reporting Method on Real Earnings Management 
 
Following the adoption of SFAS No. 2, early research provides evidence of a small or 
weak, but consistently negative, relation between mandatory expensing and R&D investment 
(e.g., Dukes et al. 1980; Wasley and Linsmeier 1992). These studies focus on expensing as a 
mechanism for managers to manipulate R&D spending. When R&D is expensed, a reduction in 
R&D expenditures results in an equivalent increase in pretax income which immediately 
improves earnings. Several studies provide additional insight into the motivation behind this 
form of RM. Archival evidence suggests that managers reduce their investments in R&D to meet 
or exceed earnings targets and analysts’ expectations, (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow and Sloan 
1991; Gunny 2005; Gunny 2010; Perry and Grinaker 1994; Roychowdhury 2006), avoid 
seasoned equity offering underpricing (Cohen and Zarowin 2010), and avoid potential debt 
covenant violations (Kim et al. 2010). Survey evidence supplements archival findings. For 
example, Graham et al. (2005) find that the majority of executives they surveyed admit that they 
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would be willing to engage in RM to meet earnings targets (80 percent) or smooth earnings (78 
percent). Collectively, these studies suggest that managers view R&D expenditures as an 
opportunity to alter short-term income in a way that is more appealing to the market.  
Requiring mandatory R&D capitalization has been suggested as a potential remedy for 
the RM problems identified with expensing R&D. Capitalization reduces the impact of R&D 
expenditures on current period earnings because the R&D expense is spread over several periods 
(Seybert 2010). Oswald and Zarowin (2007) investigate firms in the United Kingdom that 
voluntarily chose whether to expense or capitalize their R&D expenditures. Consistent with the 
premise that capitalization reduces underinvestment in R&D, firms voluntarily capitalizing have 
significantly higher investment levels in R&D than firms that expense. Other studies advocating 
the use of capitalization focus on the potential informational benefits such as stock price 
informativeness and correlations with future economic returns (e.g., Healy et al. 2002; Kothari et 
al. 2002; Lev and Zarowin 1999; Oswald and Zarowin 2007).  
While there are potential benefits to capitalizing R&D expenditures, there may also be 
unintended consequences. An innovative experimental study by Seybert (2010) takes behavioral 
considerations into account and offers evidence suggesting that capitalization can provide 
incentives for managers to engage in RM in the form of overinvestment in R&D. Discontinuing a 
failing R&D project under capitalization requires impairment of the R&D project that was 
recorded as an asset in prior years when the carrying value of the asset exceeds the sum of future 
cash flows.
1
 Thus, when R&D is capitalized managers may delay discontinuing or overinvest in 
                                                          
1
 SFAS No. 144 uses undiscounted future cash flows whereas SFAS No. 142 and IAS 36 use discounted future cash 
flows. 
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a failing project, potentially forgoing a superior alternative project, to avoid the negative 
reporting consequences of impairing the original project asset.
2
  
Capitalization and Responsibility Driven Real Earnings Management 
Seybert (2010) finds that managers personally involved in selecting a R&D project are 
more likely to continue with the failing project when expenditures are capitalized despite the 
availability of a more profitable alternative than managers assigned to the project. This tendency 
to overinvest with personal responsibility is consistent with “escalation of commitment.” 
Escalation of commitment was first described by Staw (1976) as the tendency of individuals to 
commit additional resources to a chosen course of action despite the risk of future negative 
consequences in order to justify a prior decision. The motivation to escalate commitment is 
stronger when an individual is personally responsible for selecting a project as personal 
responsibility tends to exacerbate an individual’s perceived need to justify their previous 
investment (Brockner 1992; Sleesman et al. 2012; Staw 1976).  
Seybert (2010) also demonstrates a link between overinvestment and reputation concerns, 
as his results indicate that high self-monitors (individuals who closely monitor their behavior to 
maintain desired public appearances) are more likely to overinvest than low self-monitors to 
avoid reputation damage. Managers may feel that abandoning a project that they previously 
selected reveals a possible flaw in their prior decision making logic. Admitting that a previous 
decision was mistaken could potentially bring into a question a manager’s talent and hurt his or 
her opportunities in the labor market (Kanodia et al. 1989). To supplement and further support 
                                                          
2
 Entwistle (1999) conducts a series of interviews with firm executives and finds that many opposed capitalization 
based in part on the concerns about future impairments if the project turns out to be unprofitable. The executives 
interviewed tended to have a preference for recognizing expenses in the current period in exchange for higher future 
profits. 
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his findings, Seybert (2010) conducted a follow-up survey and found that experienced executives 
anticipate that managers will be more likely to overinvest when R&D is capitalized.  
Seybert (2010) only finds a significant difference in RM between R&D methods when 
managers are personally responsible for the original investment decision. He observes no 
significant difference in the tendency to conduct RM between R&D methods when managers are 
not personally responsible for making the original investment decision. Thus, Seybert (2010) 
concludes that when managers are personally responsible for the original investment, RM 
increases when R&D is capitalized. As acknowledged by Seybert (2010, 675) this result is 
consistent with escalation of commitment behavior.  
The question arises as to whether his results are driven by escalation of commitment. If 
not, the question arises as to why he finds no relation between R&D capitalization and RM in the 
absence of manager responsibility for the original investment. This study posits that R&D 
capitalization can significantly impact RM in the absence of escalation of commitment if 
managers’ incentives to manage earnings are salient. By assigning the project to the manager 
rather than giving the manager personal responsibility for the selection of the project, this study 
removes the confounding influence of escalation of commitment. Further, this study provides 
salient incentives for overinvestment by describing the manager’s short-term performance-
contingent annual bonus.  
Capitalization and Performance Contingent Incentives for Real Earnings Management 
If the opportunity arises, the principal-agent model presumes that responsible decision 
makers will act in a self-serving manner (Hunton et al. 2008). Further, the bonus-maximization 
hypothesis purports that managers are likely to make discretionary accounting decisions to 
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maximize their short-term bonus compensation (Ibrahim and Lloyd 2011). There is extensive 
prior research linking short-term bonus compensation to accruals-based earnings management 
behavior (e.g., Balsam 1998; Carter et al. 2009; Guidry et al. 1999; Healy 1985; Ibrahim and 
Lloyd 2011). Short-term incentive structures can also provide motivation for managers to engage 
in R&D related RM. An archival study conducted by Hoskisson et al. (1993) documents a 
negative relation between short-term performance incentives and total R&D intensity. These 
findings suggest that managers reduce discretionary R&D spending or engage in RM to 
maximize their incentive compensation. An experimental study by Hunton et al. (2008) also 
provides evidence consistent with RM (reducing discretionary R&D spending) increasing in the 
presence of a short-term incentive horizon.  
Consistent with agency theory, the bonus maximization hypothesis, and the findings of 
Hoskisson et al. (1993) and Hunton et al. (2008), it is expected that short-term performance-
contingent incentives will also encourage RM in the form of overinvestment in a failing R&D 
project. As previously discussed, discontinuing a failing project under the capitalization 
reporting method typically requires impairment of the R&D project that was recorded as an asset 
in prior years. If the impairment loss reduces current net income to a level that precludes 
managers from meeting their annual bonus target, they may delay discontinuing or overinvest in 
the failing project to secure their annual bonus. This conflict of interest does not exist when 
R&D expenditures are expensed because prior period expenditures have already been deducted 
from net income. Thus, there is no asset to impair in the current year. In sum, when short-term 
incentives to maximize current income are present, the expected influence of reporting method 
on the continuation decision of a failing project is that capitalization will provide incentives for 
managers with short-term incentives to engage in activities that are consistent with earnings 
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management of real activities (i.e., overinvesting in a failing R&D project). In contrast, managers 
required to expense R&D expenditures will benefit the most from discontinuing the project. 
They will be more likely to discontinue the project and redirect resources into a more profitable 
alternative project. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Managers with short-term incentives to maximize current earnings will be more 
willing to continue with a failing project when R&D expenditures are capitalized 
relative to when such expenditures are expensed. 
Knowledge of Supervisor Incentive  
Drawing on agency theory and the bonus-maximization hypothesis, Hypothesis 1 posits 
that managers with short-term performance contingent incentives will be more likely to engage 
in RM when the R&D reporting method provides economic incentives to do so (i.e., when R&D 
expenditures are capitalized relative to when such expenditures are expensed). However, 
monetary rewards may be an incomplete motivation. Prior research provides evidence that 
individuals oftentimes deviate from the behavior that agency or conventional economic theory 
would predict, even if doing so decreases their payoff (Camerer 2003; Cohen et al. 2007; Evans 
et al. 2001; Rabin 2002). Thus, it is expected that managers will not be motivated exclusively by 
self-interest to maximize their personal wealth by continuing the project when expenditures are 
capitalized despite the financial incentive to do so. The expected benefits or utility that an 
individual receives from a course of action is a combination of both nonsocial (personal) and 
social utility. One type of social utility would be the influence of an action or decision on 
another’s payment or wealth (Gino et al. 2012). This study argues that knowledge of a 
supervisor’s compensation structure is a social factor that potentially influences managers’ 
project continuation decisions.  
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Non-Restricted Stock Compensation (Short-Term Incentive)  
 
If a supervisor has an incentive to maximize short-term earnings, then both the manager 
and supervisor will benefit from project continuation when R&D expenditures are capitalized. 
The presence of an additional beneficiary, the supervisor, may influence managers’ project 
continuation choices. Theory and data suggest that altruism, or making decisions and behaving 
with the goal of benefiting another, is a part of human nature (Piliavin and Charng 1990). Thus, 
there may also be intrinsic motivations to arrive at an outcome that benefits others (Gino et al. 
2012; Itoh 2004; Loewenstein et al. 1989). Prior data provides evidence that people have other-
regarding preferences. Individuals are willing to sacrifice for others and incorporate features 
such as fairness, equity, and reciprocity into decision making (Itoh 2004). Concern for others can 
potentially lead to undesirable behavior, such as RM. This effect is amplified when combined 
with benefits to one’s self. For example, a recent study by Gino et al. (2012) finds an increased 
propensity to engage in acts of dishonesty that benefit others when such actions also provide 
benefits to one’s self. Accordingly, the additional benefit that RM provides the supervisor may 
provide increased motivation for managers to engage in RM beyond the incentive to maximize 
personal wealth.  
Managerial behavior is likely influenced by factors other than altruism and other 
regarding preferences. The shared financial rewards resulting from RM when both the manager 
and their supervisor are compensated with short-term incentives are expected to help managers 
more easily justify and rationalize their self-interested actions (Church et al. 2012; Davis et al. 
2006; Gino et al. 2012). Bandura’s (1990) moral disengagement theory purports that individuals 
are more likely to behave unethically if they are not the sole beneficiary of such behavior. People 
self-regulate their behavior using generally accepted moral standards. Individuals tend to avoid 
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behavior that violates these standards as doing so creates a psychological cost which is self-
condemnation. However, these moral standards are not fixed. An additional beneficiary may 
enable individuals to cognitively process the decision in a way that allows them to morally 
disengage or discount the moral concerns associated with the decision without feeling distress.  
In other words, individuals unconsciously shift the decision to be compatible with their moral 
standards (Church et al. 2012).  
Moral disengagement theory implies that a shared interest makes unethical or 
questionable behavior more self-justifiable to an individual. In general, humans have an 
unconscious self-serving bias predisposing them to gather, process, and remember information in 
a self-serving way. Self-serving justifications are based on genuine, but biased, self-assessments. 
This unconscious bias helps people protect their self-image, feel better about their decisions, and 
ultimately persuade themselves that their behavior is acceptable (Gino et al. 2012; Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan 2011; Moore et al. 2006; Prentice 2007).  
Attribution theory suggests that individuals who engage in unethical behavior tend to 
externalize attribution for such acts to other individuals or environmental factors. For example, 
rather than admit that unethical behavior was motivated by personal self-interest, an individual 
might claim that such behavior was necessary to conform with social expectations or norms (e.g., 
behaviors that superiors demand from subordinates, or behaviors that are consistent with what 
others would do under those conditions). Making external attributions or shifting responsibility is 
a coping mechanism that allows individuals to rationalize their behavior (Baird and Zelin 2009; 
Davis et al. 2006). When supervisors have short-term incentives, managers may assume that their 
supervisor would make wealth maximizing choices and would expect subordinates to act in a 
similar manner. Thus, managers may attribute their RM behavior to factors beyond their control. 
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Such reasoning will likely allow managers to shift some or all of the responsibility of RM away 
from themselves and onto their supervisors. 
Per moral disengagement theory it is expected that managers will be able to more easily 
justify RM and thus be more likely to continue a failing project when the benefit of doing so is 
shared. Further, attribution theory proposes that managers can more easily rationalize their self-
interested behavior by attributing their behavior to what their supervisor would expect them to 
do. Collectively these theories, as well as a preference for altruism, suggest that when a manager 
is aware that the supervisor has an incentive that encourages maximizing current period earnings, 
s/he will be more likely to continue the project when expenditures are capitalized (or engage in 
real earnings management) than in the absence of this knowledge. Accordingly, when R&D 
expenditures are capitalized, it is predicted that the potential benefits to the supervisor will create 
an additional motivation for managers to continue the original project or manage earnings 
through real activities.  This predicted effect is formally recognized in the following hypothesis: 
H2: When R&D expenditures are capitalized, managers with knowledge that their 
supervisors have non-restricted stock compensation will be more willing to continue 
with a failing project than will managers with no knowledge of their supervisors’ 
compensation package. 
Restricted Stock Compensation (Long-term Incentive) 
 
When a supervisor has a long-term incentive, then s/he will not benefit from continuing a 
failing R&D project when R&D expenditures are capitalized. Given a situation where the 
manager has short-term incentives, the resulting incentive misalignment creates a potential 
conflict of interest. While avoiding an impending impairment loss by continuing a R&D project 
will increase short-term earnings (consistent with the manager’s short-term incentives), project 
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continuation conflicts with the long-term welfare of the supervisor, organization, and its 
stakeholders.  
Knowledge that the supervisor’s compensation structure incentivizes long-term earnings 
may discourage managers from engaging in RM. Managers’ decisions in conflict of interest 
situations may be influenced by accountability pressures. A conflict of interest can enhance 
managers’ perceived accountability or the obligation to explain previous decisions when asked to 
do so. Accountability demands create pressure to behave in a way that can be acceptably justified 
(Beeler and Hunton 1997; Hunton et al. 2010; Kirby and Davis 1998; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 
2011). The dominant accountability pressure a manager experiences at work originates from 
individuals in positions of power within the organization (i.e., a manager’s supervisor). 
Managers are likely to perceive that their supervisors will more closely scrutinize their behavior 
when there is a conflict of interest such as misaligned incentive horizons. Prior accountability 
research indicates that the misalignment between managers’ and supervisors’ incentive horizons 
may compel managers to become unsure and more critical of their decision making (Merkl-
Davies and Brennan 2011).   
The requirement to justify one’s previous judgments and decisions encourages deliberate 
attitude shifting which typically results in a de-biasing effect (Fox and Staw 1979; Moore et al. 
2006; Tetlock et al. 1989). Specifically, accountability encourages more accurate decision 
making by causing decision makers to be less influenced by prior beliefs, focus more on 
available evidence, and ultimately make more complex judgments (Simonson and Staw 1992). 
Accordingly, when a manager is aware that his or her supervisor has a conflicting incentive 
horizon, it is expected that demands for accountability will discourage project continuation as it 
will be more challenging for managers to justify overinvestment in the failing project. In other 
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words, it will be more difficult for managers to defend decisions driven by the desire to 
maximize personal wealth when they know that such decisions will have a detrimental impact on 
their supervisor’s wealth. 
According to self-presentation theory, individuals are motivated to purposefully manage 
the impression others have of them (Sleesman et al. 2012). Managers may make choices they 
feel will be viewed favorably by their superiors in order to manage their superiors’ perceptions 
or impressions of them as subordinates. Impression management, a common phenomenon in 
organizations, is a process where individuals attempt to present themselves in a way that will be 
perceived positively by others (Bolino and Turnley 1999; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2011; 
Wayne and Linden 1995). Prior organizational behavior research indicates that impression 
management strategies can alter supervisors’ perceptions about employees and lead to employee 
benefits, such as better future performance evaluations and career advancement opportunities 
(Wayne and Linden 1995). Research in social psychology suggests that impression management 
can be motivated by the social presence of others whose behavior management is trying to 
anticipate. Other psychological factors driving impression management include the desire to 
maximize rewards and minimize sanctions (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2011).  
A company’s incentive structure creates an implicit pressure for managers to infer what 
their supervisors want without being given explicit direction (Baird and Zelin 2009; Prentice 
2007). In the context of the current study, managers will likely anticipate that their supervisors 
will not support the use of RM because it conflicts with their supervisors’ incentives. Managers’ 
fears of negative repercussions and reputation damage may intensify suspecting that the 
supervisor views RM as undesirable behavior. Further, the fear of failing to please their 
supervisors may cause managers significant stress due to the negative impact it could potentially 
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have on their careers. Managers will likely anticipate that engaging in RM will cause their 
supervisors to respond in undesirable ways, for example, in the form of unfavorable performance 
evaluations or recommendations for career advancement. Thus, it is expected that self-
presentational motives will encourage managerial behavior or choices consistent with the 
preferences of upper-level management (i.e., avoiding the use of RM) to counteract the potential 
negative consequences of failing to do so.  
Managers are expected to take their supervisors’ compensation into account when 
making decisions that influence net income in current and future periods. When a manager is 
aware that their supervisor has a conflicting long-term compensation structure, it is likely that 
they will feel greater accountability pressures to behave in ways that can be acceptably justified. 
Further, self-presentation theory suggests that managers may avoid RM in an effort to present 
themselves favorably to supervisors. Personal financial gains that managers would receive from 
making the decision to continue a failing R&D project will likely be outweighed by the increased 
perceived need to justify their decisions and the desire to maintain a positive reputation in the 
organization. In other words, the conflict of interest created by the knowledge that the supervisor 
has a long-term incentive will deter managers from continuing the original project or managing 
earnings through real activities. Accordingly, when R&D expenditures are capitalized, it is 
anticipated that managers who are aware that their supervisor has a compensation package with 
restricted stock compensation will be less likely to continue the original project (or engage in 
real earnings management) than in the absence of this knowledge. The above discussion leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
H3: When R&D expenditures are capitalized, managers with knowledge that their 
supervisors have restricted stock compensation will be less willing to continue with a 
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failing project than will managers with no knowledge of their supervisors’ 
compensation package. 
Interaction between R&D Reporting Method and Supervisor Incentive Horizon 
 
When R&D expenditures are expensed, the manager does not benefit from project 
continuation. Regardless of supervisor incentive horizon, it is expected that managers will be less 
likely to continue the project with the expensing method.  Conversely, the effect of capitalization 
on RM is dependent on the supervisor’s incentive horizon. When a manager’s incentive horizon 
is aligned with that of their supervisor (i.e., both short-term) moral disengagement theory, 
attribution theory, and a preference for altruism indicate that the presence of an additional 
beneficiary, the supervisor, will increase managerial motivation to continue the original project 
or engage in RM when R&D expenditures are capitalized. In contrast, when the manager has a 
short-term horizon and the supervisor has a long-term horizon, accountability pressures and 
impression management are hypothesized to deter managers from continuing the original project 
when R&D expenditures are capitalized. The predicted difference in RM between the two R&D 
reporting methods should be greatest when the managers have knowledge that their supervisors 
are being compensated with short-term, non-restricted stock compensation, next greatest when 
managers have no knowledge of supervisor compensation and lowest when managers have 
knowledge that their supervisors are compensated with long-term, restricted stock compensation. 
Accordingly, it is anticipated that supervisor incentive horizon will moderate the relationship 
between R&D reporting method and managers’ willingness to continue with a failing project. 
This predicted interaction is formally reflected in the following hypothesis: 
H4: The difference in managers’ willingness to continue with a failing project 
between R&D reporting methods will be greatest when managers have knowledge 
that their supervisors are compensated with non-restricted stock compensation, next 
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greatest when managers have no knowledge of their supervisors’ compensation, and 
lowest when managers have knowledge that their supervisors are compensated with 
restricted stock compensation. 
III. METHOD 
Design and Participants 
This study utilizes a 2x3 between-participants design, manipulating both R&D reporting 
method (expense vs. capitalize) and knowledge of supervisor compensation (control group with 
no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. knowledge of restricted 
stock compensation). Graduate students enrolled in business courses from a large public 
university were recruited for voluntary participation in experimental sessions and were randomly 
assigned to one of the six treatment groups. Graduate business students were used as proxies for 
managers. Given the experience and business knowledge of the graduate business students, this 
participant group was deemed to have adequate knowledge to achieve the goals of the 
experiment (Libby et al. 2002). Seybert (2010) uses M.B.A. students for a similar task and finds 
evidence supporting this participant group has the knowledge necessary and sufficient to 
meaningfully complete the task. Additionally, to help ensure that participants understood the 
accounting concepts, the case materials explicitly explained the reporting and income 
consequences of both decisions for the assigned R&D reporting method.  
Task and Procedures  
Participants read a hypothetical case where they were asked to assume the role of a 
manager who faces a R&D investment decision. Experimental materials included an information 
sheet describing informed consent, case materials, case questions, and a post-experimental 
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questionnaire including questions related to manipulation checks, debriefing items, and 
demographic variables. Participants were instructed to return the experimental materials back to 
the administrator immediately after they finished the last section. During the experimental 
session, participants were not allowed to communicate with one another about the task, which 
required approximately 15 minutes to complete.  
The case materials provide background information on the company, the independent 
variable manipulations, and the decision context. Consistent with Seybert (2010), participants 
were asked to assume the role of a R&D manager tasked with managing and evaluating the 
investments in various R&D projects at a public company that produces electronic devices. 
However, there is an important distinction from Seybert (2010).  Rather than manipulating 
project responsibility, all participants in this study were informed that they had recently been 
reassigned the main case project to minimize the potential for escalation of commitment. The 
case also included information about the financial goals of the company and the participants’ 
compensation structure. All participants were incentivized with a short-term (annual) bonus 
equivalent to 30 percent of their salary if company earnings targets were met. This bonus rate is 
consistent with rates reported in prior literature examining managerial compensation (e.g. Guidry 
et al. 1999; Jackson et al. 2008; Hunton et al. 2008). Consistent with Guidry et al. (1999) 
bonuses were awarded based on earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).  
After the R&D reporting method and knowledge of supervisor compensation 
manipulations, which are discussed in the next section, consistent with Seybert (2010) 
participants were informed that the technology in the assigned project was not performing as 
well as originally anticipated. Participants were presented with information about an alternative 
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R&D project that required the same current investment but had higher expected future cash flows 
than the original project.  
In the expense condition, prior period expenditures were already deducted from net 
income and recording an impairment loss would not be a concern for either of the project 
choices. When R&D expenditures are capitalized, both the discounted and undiscounted future 
cash flows of the original project asset exceed its carrying amount. Thus, under both U.S. GAAP 
(i.e., SFAS No. 114, SFAS No. 142) and IFRS (i.e., IAS 36) an impairment loss would be 
triggered if the original project was discontinued to write-down the value of the long-term asset 
that was originally recorded in a prior year. The company would not have to recognize an 
impairment loss if the project was continued. This created a conflict for participants in the 
capitalization condition. If they chose to discontinue the original project to increase future period 
cash flows, the impairment loss and related decrease in current period income prohibited them 
from receiving their current year bonus. The bonus was not interrupted if participants chose to 
continue with the original project.  
After the case was created, it was pilot tested with 92 undergraduate business students at 
a large state university. Slight revisions were made after the pilot test. The revisions were aimed 
at improving the clarity of the experimental manipulations and decreasing the time required for 
completing the experimental task. 
Independent Variables  
The first independent variable, R&D reporting method, was manipulated at two levels 
(capitalize vs. expense). Participants were informed that R&D expenditures were either expensed 
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or capitalized. Consistent with their treatment, participants also received information explaining 
how the R&D reporting method impacted net income. Project-specific financial statements 
prepared in accordance with the randomly assigned R&D reporting method were provided as a 
supplement to the case materials. In the expense condition, current net income is not impacted by 
the project continuation decision. However, discontinuing the original project and switching to 
the alternative project improved future net income. In contrast, for participants in the 
capitalization condition, switching to the alternative project triggered an impairment loss which 
decreased current net income and excluded them from any bonus potential. 
 The second independent variable, knowledge of supervisor compensation, was 
manipulated at three levels (knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. knowledge of 
restricted stock compensation). A control group with no knowledge of their supervisor’s 
compensation was also included as the third level. Patterned after Bierstaker et al. (2012) and 
consistent with practice, the compensation plan for all executives was comprised of 20 percent 
cash and 80 percent stock compensation. In the short-term incentive horizon treatment the stock 
compensation was described as non-restricted and could be sold at any time. In contrast, the 
long-term incentive horizon was characterized by restricted long-term stock compensation that 
could be sold five years after it was received. Consistent with prior research (i.e., Bierstaker et al. 
2012; Magilke et al. 2009), the supervisor compensation package was deliberately simplistic to 
provide a basic orientation of the compensation horizon. 
Dependent Variable  
Participants were required to allocate six million dollars of R&D funds in the current 
year. They were asked to decide between the following two actions: (1) authorizing six million 
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dollars to continue the original large LCD screen project, or (2) discontinuing the original large 
LCD screen projected and authorizing the six million dollars to be used towards the development 
of a new product. The primary dependent measure captured the likelihood of participants 
continuing with the originally selected failing project as opposed to the new, more profitable 
project. The dependent variable was captured with three different questions. This choice to 
continue the original project or switch to the new project was captured in absolute terms. 
Additionally, participants indicated their willingness to continue with the original project and 
likelihood of switching to the new project on 11-point Likert scales.  
Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
The post-experimental questionnaire included questions related to manipulation checks, 
debriefing items, and demographic variables. Two manipulation check questions about the 
independent variables were included to ensure the participants attended to the details of the case 
and to ascertain the validity of the dependent variable responses. Debriefing questions about the 
independent variables were included to ensure that the manipulations had the intended effect. 
Questions were also included to better understand the psychological motivations driving the 
participants’ decisions. Demographic information about the participants’ education, age, gender, 
and employment experience were also collected to test as potential covariates and to ascertain 
randomization.  
IV. RESULTS 
Sample Demographics and Covariates 
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A total of 161 graduate business students participated in the experiment. Table 1 
summarizes participants’ demographic information. As indicated in Panels A and B, the average 
participant was 27 years old (39.0 percent of the sample was between 20 and 24 years old). 
Participants had approximately five years of professional work experience (45.2 percent of the 
sample had between one and four years of work experience). Of the total sample, 103 (64.4 
percent) were male. None of the collected demographic variables were significant covariates 
(smallest p = 0.39).  Accordingly, these variables were not included as covariates in the 
subsequent analyses. To investigate randomization, R&D reporting method and managerial 
knowledge of supervisor compensation were included as the independent variables in a 
MANOVA model. The demographic variables were included as the dependent variables. A lack 
of significance (smallest p = 0.42) provides reasonable assurance that the randomization 
procedure was effective.  
Manipulation Checks 
To verify the successful manipulation of the independent variables, manipulation check 
questions were included in the post-experimental questionnaire. The first question asked 
participants to indicate whether R&D expenditures were expensed or capitalized. Of the 160 
participants responding to this question, 147 (91.3 percent) responded correctly. The second 
manipulation check question concerned supervisor incentive horizon. Participants designated 
whether their supervisors’ stock compensation was short-term and available for immediate sale 
or long-term and vesting in five years. Participants in the control group did not receive the 
second manipulation check question. Of the 108 participants responding to this question, 98 
(90.7 percent) responded correctly. To provide further assurance that participants properly 
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attended to the experimental manipulations, only observations for participants that passed the 
manipulation check questions (n = 138) were used for the analyses in the results that follow.
3
 
 
TABLE 1 
Participant Demographics 
 
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations 
   
       Variable 
 
n 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
Age 
 
159 
 
27.29 
 
5.97 
Work Experience 
 
155 
 
4.80 
 
5.73 
 
Panel B: Frequencies and Percentages 
    
       Variable 
 
Response 
 
n 
 
Percent 
Gender 
 
Male 
 
103 
 
64.4% 
  
Female 
 
57 
 
35.6% 
Age 
 
20-24 
 
62 
 
39.0% 
  
25-29 
 
54 
 
34.0% 
  
30-34 
 
30 
 
18.9% 
  
35-39 
 
9 
 
5.7% 
  
40+ 
 
4 
 
2.5% 
Professional Work Experience 
 
Less than 1 yr. 
 
28 
 
18.1% 
  
1-4 years 
 
70 
 
45.2% 
  
5-9 years 
 
35 
 
22.6% 
  
10+ years 
 
22 
 
14.2% 
 
To provide further assurance that the responses to the dependent measures were not 
confounded by escalation of commitment, participants were asked a question to gauge their 
perceived involvement with the original LCD project. Participants indicated whether they made 
the original decision to start the project or the project was reassigned to them because the 
original project manager left the firm.  Of the 161 participants that responded to this question, 
                                                          
3
 The majority of results are unchanged if the participants that failed the manipulation check questions are included. 
The main effect of R&D reporting method becomes insignificant if these participants are included. 
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152 (94.4 percent) responded correctly, indicating a successful manipulation of original project 
responsibility.  
Dependent Variables 
 
Descriptive statistics for each of the dependent measures, the absolute choice to continue 
or discontinue the original project, likelihood of continuing the original project, and likelihood of 
switching to the new project, are summarized in Table 2, Panels A, B, and C.  Panel A provides a 
contingency table with row percents for the absolute choice dependent measure. When 
participants were asked to make an absolute choice between the two projects, 28 percent of 
participants were willing to continue the original project. Participants who capitalized R&D 
expenditures were more likely to continue the original project than participants who expensed 
R&D expenditures (38.6 percent vs. 17.6 percent, respectively, t = 5.57, p < 0.01, one-tailed). 
Participants with knowledge that their supervisors were compensated with short-term incentives 
were more likely to continue the project than participants with no knowledge of their 
supervisors’ compensation, but this difference is not statistically significant (32.6 percent vs. 
28.9 percent, respectively, t = 0.76, p = 0.35, one-tailed). Participants with knowledge that their 
supervisors were compensated with long-term incentives were insignificantly less likely to 
continue the project than participants with no knowledge of their supervisors’ compensation 
(23.4 percent vs. 28.9 percent, respectively, t = 1.19, p = 0.28, one-tailed). 
As reported in Panel B, the mean likelihood of project continuation is 3.94 for all 
participants. Participants who capitalized R&D expenditures were more likely than participants 
who expensed R&D expenditures to continue the original project (4.14 vs. 3.75, respectively, t = 
1.50, p = 0.23, one-tailed). Participants with knowledge that their supervisors were compensated 
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with short-term incentives were more likely to continue the original project (4.13) than 
participants with knowledge that their supervisors were compensated with long-term incentives 
(3.94) or participants with no knowledge of supervisory compensation (3.78). However, the 
mean differences between these groups were not statistically significant (t = 0.17 and p = 0.39, 
and t = 0.67 and p = 0.28, respectively). 
As reported in Panel C, the mean likelihood of switching to the new project is 7.04 for all 
participants. Consistent with Panel B, the results presented in Panel C indicate that participants 
who capitalized R&D expenditures were less likely to switch to the new project than participants 
who expensed R&D expenditures (6.96 versus 7.13, respectively, t = 0.82 and p = 0.34, one-
tailed). Consistent with expectations, participants with knowledge that their supervisors were 
compensated with short-term incentives were less likely (6.50) to switch to the new project than 
participants with knowledge that their supervisors are compensated with long-term incentives 
(7.50) and participants with no knowledge of supervisor compensation (6.83). However, the 
mean differences were not statistically significant (t = 0.05 and p = 0.43, and t = 0.01 and p = 
0.47, respectively). 
  
  
33 
 
 
TABLE 2 
 Descriptive Results 
 
Panel A: Contingency Table with Row Percents for Absolute Choice of Project Continuation 
R&D Reporting Method   Yes   No   Total 
EXP
a
   12   56   68 
    17.6%   82.4%   49.3% 
CAP
b
   27   43   70 
    38.6%   61.4%   50.7% 
Total   39   99   138 
    28.3%   71.7%   100.0% 
 
Descriptive Results 
Panel B: Means (Standard Deviations) for Likelihood of Continuing the Original Project 
           Variable 
 
NON 
 
RES 
 
CONT 
 
Average 
  EXP
a
 
 
3.58 
 
4.22 
 
3.43 
 
3.75 
  
  
(3.13) 
 
(3.55) 
 
(3.03) 
 
(3.22) 
  
  
n = 24 
 
n = 23 
 
n = 21 
 
n = 68 
  CAP
b
 
 
4.73 
 
3.67 
 
4.08 
 
4.14 
  
  
(2.68) 
 
(3.34) 
 
(2.78) 
 
(2.95) 
  
  
n =22 
 
n = 24 
 
n = 24 
 
n = 70 
  Average 
 
4.13 
 
3.94 
 
3.78 
 
3.94 
  
  
(2.95) 
 
(3.42) 
 
(2.88) 
 
(3.07) 
  
  
n = 46 
 
n = 47 
 
n = 45 
 
n = 138 
   
Panel C: Means (Standard Deviations) for Likelihood of Switching to the New Project 
          Variable 
 
NON 
 
RES 
 
CONT 
 
Average 
 EXP
a
 
 
7.62 
 
6.48 
 
7.29 
 
7.13 
 
  
(2.34) 
 
(2.81) 
 
(2.51) 
 
(2.57) 
 
  
n = 24 
 
n = 23 
 
n = 21 
 
n = 68 
 CAP
b
 
 
6.50 
 
7.50 
 
6.83 
 
6.96 
 
  
(2.13) 
 
(2.67) 
 
(2.46) 
 
(2.44) 
 
  
n =22 
 
n = 24 
 
n = 24 
 
n = 70 
 Average 
 
7.09 
 
7.00 
 
7.04 
 
7.04 
 
  
(2.29) 
 
(2.78) 
 
(2.47) 
 
(2.50) 
 
  
n = 46 
 
n = 47 
 
n = 45 
 
n = 138 
  
a
 EXP = Expense 
b 
CAP = Capitalize 
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Table 3, Panel A presents the correlations between the independent and dependent variables.  
The relationship between R&D reporting method and participants’ absolute decisions to continue 
the original project was positive and significant (r = 0.23, p < 0.01, two-tailed). This suggests 
that the tendency to recommend continuance was higher when R&D was capitalized relative to 
when R&D was expensed. Table 3, Panel A presents the correlations between the independent 
and dependent variables. The relationship between R&D reporting method and participants’ 
absolute decisions to continue the original project was positive and significant (r = 0.23, p < 
0.01, two-tailed). This suggests that the tendency to recommend continuance was higher for 
R&D capitalization in relation to immediately expensing R&D expenditures. In addition, as 
anticipated, all of the dependent variable measures were significantly correlated (all p < 0.01). 
To simplify the presentation of the results, the scaled dependent variables were combined to 
create a single variable. To create the composite variable, the scaled dependent measure 
capturing the likelihood of switching to the new project was reverse coded and averaged with the 
other scaled dependent measure that captures the likelihood to continue the original project. 
Therefore, a higher number represents a greater likelihood to continue the original project. This 
leaves two dependent measures; (1) the absolute choice and (2) the composite measure. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1 explores the main effect of R&D reporting method. More specifically, it 
investigates how the presence of personal short-term incentives influences a manager’s 
propensity to engage in RM in the form of overinvestment in a failing project when R&D 
expenditures are capitalized relative to when R&D expenditures are expensed. Hypotheses 2 and 
3 investigate the influence of knowledge of a supervisor’s compensation on a manager’s  
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TABLE 3 
Bivariate Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables 
Pearson (Spearman Rank) above (below) Diagonal 
 
 
METH COMP CONT SWITCH CHOICE 
METH
a
 1.000 0.450 0.640 -0.350 0.232*** 
COMP
b
 0.045 1.000 -0.047 -0.007 -0.034 
CONT
c
 0.086 -0.060 1.000 -0.683*** 0.724*** 
SWITCH
d
 -0.066 0.017 -0.712*** 1.000 -0.755*** 
CHOICE
e
 0.232*** -0.034 0.674*** -0.700*** 1.000 
 
 
a
 METH = R&D reporting method; 1 if R&D expenditures were capitalized; 0 if expensed  
b
 COMP = Managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation; 0 if manager received information that supervisors 
receive non-restricted stock compensation, 1 if manager received information that supervisors receive restricted 
stock compensation, and 3 if the manager did not receive information about supervisor compensation (control)  
c
 CONT = Control group; no knowledge of supervisor compensation 
d
 SWITCH = composite dependent variable; 0 = Discontinue, 10 = Continue 
e
 CHOICE = Absolute choice dependent variable; 0 = Discontinue, 1 = Continue 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
propensity to engage in RM. More specifically, H2 postulates that when R&D expenditures are 
capitalized, managers with knowledge that their supervisors are receiving short-term, non-
restricted stock compensation will be more willing to continue with the original project than 
managers with no knowledge of their supervisors’ compensation. Managerial knowledge that 
supervisors are receiving long-term, restricted stock compensation is predicted to have a 
different impact. Hypothesis 3 posits that when R&D expenditures are capitalized, managers 
with knowledge that their supervisors are receiving long-term, restricted stock compensation will 
be less willing to continue with the original project than managers with no knowledge of their 
supervisors’ compensation. Hypothesis 4 predicts an interaction between R&D reporting method 
and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation. The difference in RM between the two 
R&D reporting methods is expected to be greatest when managers have knowledge that their 
supervisors are being compensated with short-term, non-restricted stock compensation, next 
greatest when managers have no knowledge of supervisor compensation and lowest when 
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managers have knowledge that their supervisors are compensated with long-term, restricted stock 
compensation. 
The hypotheses were first tested using logistic regression and discriminant analysis. 
Results for the categorical dependent variable are presented in Table 4, Panel A. When all three 
predictors were considered together, the model was significant (χ2 = 8.35, df = 3, N = 138, p < 
0.10).  Consistent with H1, the main effect for R&D reporting method was positive and 
significant (p < 0.05) with an odds ratio of 4.11. This suggests that capitalizing R&D 
expenditures increases the odds of deciding to continue the project by 4.11 times. Managerial 
knowledge of supervisor compensation had the next highest odds ratio (effect size) of 1.08.  
However, the main effect for this variable (p = 0.84) as well as the interaction between R&D 
reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation were not statistically 
significant (p = 0.50). This suggests that there is no effect of managerial knowledge of supervisor 
compensation structure on participants’ project continuance decisions and that this knowledge 
does not moderate the effect of R&D reporting method. 
Discriminant analysis was conducted to assess whether the two predictors could 
distinguish participants who choose to continue the original project from those who did not. 
Wilks’ lambda was significant, λ = 0.94, χ2 = 7.76, p < 0.05, which indicates that the model 
including these two variables was able to significantly discriminate the two groups. As indicated 
in Panel B of Table 4, the results from the discriminant analysis indicate that participants’ 
choices to continue the original project varies depending on R&D reporting method (χ2 = 7.76, p 
< 0.01), but does not vary based on managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation (χ2 = 
0.16, p = 0.69).  This provides additional support for H1 but not the other hypotheses. 
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TABLE 4 
Hypotheses Testing (Categorical Dependent Variable) 
 
Panel A: Traditional Categorical Modeling Statistic Test (Logistic Regression)  
         
Source 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
Two-Tailed    
p-value 
METH
a
 
 
1.41 
 
0.64 
 
4.11 
 
0.03 
COMP
b
 
 
0.08 
 
0.39 
 
1.08 
 
0.84 
METH*COMP 
 
-0.34 
 
0.50 
 
0.71 
 
0.50 
Constant 
 
-1.62 
 
0.50 
 
0.20 
 
0.00 
 
 
Panel B: Discriminant Analysis 
    
       
Source 
 
Chi-Square Statistic 
 
df 
 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
METH
a
 
 
7.76 
 
1 
 
0.006 
COMP
b
 
 
0.158 
 
1 
 
0.692 
 
 
a
 METH = R&D reporting method; 1 if R&D expenditures were capitalized; 0 if expensed  
b
 COMP = Managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation; 0 if manager received information that supervisors 
receive non-restricted stock compensation, 1 if manager received information that supervisors receive restricted 
stock compensation, and 3 if the manager did not receive information about supervisor compensation (control)  
 
The hypotheses were also tested with an ANOVA, including the composite measure of 
project continuation as the dependent variable and R&D reporting method and managerial 
knowledge of supervisor compensation as the independent variables.
4
 Table 5 presents the 
results. As predicted, participants were more likely to continue the original project and less likely 
to switch to the alternative project when R&D expenditures were capitalized relative to 
expensed. However, as indicated in Panel A, the main effect for R&D reporting method was not 
significant (F = 0.47, p = 0.49, two-tailed). This does not support H1. The main effect for 
                                                          
4
 Through randomly sampling and assignment, assumptions of independent observations were met. The skewness 
for each group of the dependent variable was < +/-1.0 indicating that the distribution of the dependent variable was 
approximately normal. Levene’s test was not statistically significant (p = 0.71).  Thus, the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was not violated.  
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managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation was also insignificant (F = 0.07, p = 0.93, 
two-tailed). Again, the results are inconsistent with the predictions (H2 and H3). These main 
effect results must be viewed in light of the predicted interaction between the R&D reporting 
method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation variables. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts an interaction between R&D reporting method and managerial 
knowledge of supervisor compensation. As hypothesized, when R&D expenditures were 
capitalized, managers with knowledge that their supervisors were compensated with non-
restricted stock compensation were the most likely to continue the original project, followed by 
participants with no knowledge of supervisor compensation and participants with knowledge that 
their supervisors were compensated with restricted stock compensation, respectively. However, 
the interaction term was not statistically significant (F = 1.71, p = 0.19, two-tailed) indicating 
that the impact of R&D reporting method on RM was not dependent on managerial knowledge 
of supervisor compensation. Figure 1 illustrates the observed interaction pattern.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Observed Interaction Plot 
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In addition to ANOVA, given the predicted ordinal interaction, planned contrast analyses 
were conducted to provide a more powerful test of the hypotheses.
5
 Two alternative sets of 
contrast weights were utilized to test H1and H4 (see Panel B of Table 5). Simple effects tests 
were used to assess H2 and H3 and further interpret H4. The first contrast (-1, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1) 
consists of the weights +1 for the capitalize conditions and -1 for the expense conditions and 
tests whether the likelihood to continue the original project is higher when R&D expenditures are 
capitalized compared to when expenditures are expensed. Consistent with the findings of the 
ANOVA, the contrast is not statistically significant (F = 0.69, p = 0.49, two-tailed) (see Panel C 
of Table 5).  
The contrast between D (capitalize and control) and E (capitalize and non-restricted stock 
compensation) can be used to further investigate H2. The contrast confirms that there is not a 
statistically significant difference in the propensity to engage in RM when R&D expenditures are 
capitalized between participants with no knowledge of managerial compensation and participants 
with knowledge that managers are compensated with non-restricted stock compensation (F = 
0.64, p = 0.52). Thus, H2 is not supported. The contrast between D (capitalize and control) and F 
(capitalize and restricted stock compensation) concerns H3. The contrast provides no evidence of 
a significant difference (F = 0.73, p = 0.47) in the likelihood of continuing the original project 
between participants with no knowledge of supervisor compensation and participants with 
knowledge that supervisors receive restricted stock compensation when R&D expenditures are 
capitalized.  
                                                          
5
 Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990) argue that the traditional ANOVA is not powerful for testing hypotheses 
involving ordinal interactions. Contrast analysis was deemed to be a more appropriate test of the predictions in this 
study as it improves statistical power over ANOVA without increasing Type I error rates. 
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The second planned interaction contrast (-2, -2, -2, 2, 3, 1) was also insignificant (F = 
1.03, p = 0.31). Follow-up simple effect tests reveal that there is not a significant difference in 
the mean likelihood to continue the original project between participants with knowledge that 
their supervisors received non-restricted versus participants with knowledge that their 
supervisors received restricted stock compensation when R&D expenditures are capitalized (F = 
1.36, p = 0.18). Consequently, the statistical results for the composite dependent variable do not 
provide support for any of the hypotheses. 
Supplemental Analyses 
Using the data that was collected in the post-experimental questionnaire, the 
supplemental analyses further investigate some of the assumptions that were used to develop the 
hypotheses related to managerial knowledge of executive compensation. Moral disengagement 
theory and attribution theory were used to develop H2. Per moral disengagement theory it is 
expected that managers will be able to more easily justify RM and thus be more likely to 
continue a failing project when the benefit of doing so is shared. Participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they believed they would be able to justify continuing the original 
project. Responses were measured on an 11-point Likert scale anchored at “not at all justifiable” 
(0) and “completely justifiable” (10) with a mean response of 5.04. Contrary to expectations, 
participants capitalizing R&D expenditures with knowledge that their supervisors were 
compensated with short-term incentives did not perceive continuing the original project to be 
more justifiable than participants in the other cells.
6
  
 
                                                          
6
 A T-test and an ANOVA model with perceived ability to justify continuing the original project as the dependent 
variable and R&D reporting method and knowledge of supervisor compensation as the independent variables were 
used to test this assumption. The results (not tabulated) were not significant (all p > 0.10). 
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TABLE 5 
Hypotheses Testing (Composite Dependent Variable) 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)  
      
           
Source 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
 
Mean 
Square 
 
F-
statistic 
 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
METH
a
 
 
3.1 
 
1 
 
3.1 
 
0.47 
 
0.49 
COMP
b
 
 
0.9 
 
2 
 
0.5 
 
0.07 
 
0.93 
METH*COMP 
 
22.6 
 
2 
 
11.3 
 
1.71 
 
0.19 
Error 
 
874.4 
 
132 
 
6.6 
     
Panel B: Contrast Coefficients 
          
Contrast 
 
Cell A: 
EXP
c
 & 
CONT
d
 
 
Cell B: 
EXP
c
 & 
NON
e
 
 
Cell C:     
EXP
c
 &       
RES
f
 
 
Cell D: 
CAP
g
 & 
CONT
d
 
 
Cell E: 
CAP
g
 & 
NON
e
 
 
Cell F: 
CAP
g
 
& RES
f
 
1 
 
-1 
 
-1 
 
-1 
 
+1 
 
+1 
 
+1 
2 
 
-2 
 
-2 
 
-2 
 
+2 
 
+3 
 
+1 
 
 
 
a
 METH = R&D reporting method; 1 if R&D expenditures were capitalized; 0 if expensed  
Panel C: Planned Contrast Tests and Follow-Up Simple Effect Tests
Source
t-statistic 
(two-tailed) p-value
Contrast 1 (-1, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1) Overall Test: 0.69 0.49
Expected likelihood of project continuation is greatest 
when R&D expenditures are capitalized and lowest when 
R&D expenditures are expensed.
Contrast 2 (-2, -2, -2, 2, 3, 1) Overall Test: 1.03 0.31
Expected likelihood of project continuation is greatest 
when R&D expenditures are capitalized and managers 
have knowledge that supervisors receive non-restricted 
stock compensation, next greatest when R&D 
expenditures are capitalized and managers have no 
knowledge of supervisor compensation, next greatest 
when R&D expenditures are capitalized and managers 
have knowledge that supervisors receive restricted stock 
compensation, and significantly lower in the other three 
(expense) conditions.
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests:
(1) D versus E 0.64 0.52
(2) D versus F 0.73 0.47
(3) E versus F 1.36 0.18
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b
 COMP = Managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation; 0 if manager received information that supervisors 
receive non-restricted stock compensation, 1 if manager received information that supervisors receive restricted 
stock compensation, and 3 if the manager did not receive information about supervisor compensation (control)  
c
 EXP = Expense 
d
 CONT = Control group; no knowledge of supervisor compensation 
e
 NON = Non-restricted stock compensation; can be sold at any time 
f
 RES = Restricted stock compensation; can be sold five years after receipt 
g
 CAP = Capitalize 
 
When supervisors have short-term incentives, attribution theory suggests that their 
subordinates will likely assume that the supervisors would make and expect their subordinates to 
make wealth maximizing choices. Thus, when R&D expenditures are capitalized, managers 
likely shifted some or all of the responsibility away from themselves and onto their supervisors. 
Given this reasoning, when R&D expenditures are capitalized, a negative association is expected 
between perceived personal responsibility and knowledge that supervisors receive short-term, 
non-restricted stock compensation. Alternatively stated, it is expected that perceived personal 
responsibility will be the lowest in the cell where R&D expenditures are capitalized and 
managers have knowledge that their supervisors receive similar non-restricted stock 
compensation. 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt they would be held personally 
responsible for the outcome of their investment decisions.  The responses were measured on an 
11-point Likert scale anchored at “not at all responsible” (0) and “completely responsible” (10). 
The mean response for this question was 7.37. Results from an ANOVA with participant 
responses to the aforementioned question as the dependent variable and R&D reporting method 
and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation as the independent variables are 
presented in Panel A of Table 6. While the main effects of R&D reporting method and 
managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation were not significant (F = 0.39 and 0.72, p = 
0.39 and 0.72, two-tailed, respectively), the interaction between these terms was significant (F = 
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3.69, p < 0.05). Panel A of Figure 2 plots the observed interaction results and suggests perceived 
personal responsibility is significantly lower when R&D expenditures are capitalized and 
managers have knowledge that their supervisors receive non-restricted stock compensation.  
Since the interaction is significant, it is possible that there are significant main effects that 
are masked by the significant interaction. This means there may be no differences between the 
two methods or there are differences that the statistical test cannot determine. A planned contrast 
analysis was used to further explore the interaction between R&D reporting method and 
managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on perceived personal responsibility. The 
contrast (-1,-1,-1,-1, 5, -1) weights Cell E (capitalize and non-restricted) 5 and the remaining 
cells receive a weight of -1. As predicted, the contrast is statistically significant (F = -2.31, p < 
.05, two-tailed) (see Panel B of Table 6). Consistent with attribution theory, these results suggest 
that when R&D expenditures are capitalized, participants with knowledge that their supervisors 
receive non-restricted stock compensation felt significantly less responsible for the outcomes of 
their decisions.   
Self-presentation theory was the primary theory used to develop H3. When R&D 
expenditures are capitalized and managers have knowledge that supervisors receive restricted 
stock compensation, self-presentation theory suggests that managers may make choices that they 
feel will be viewed favorably by their supervisors in order to manage their supervisors’ 
perceptions or impressions of them as subordinates. This theory implies that the personal 
financial gains that managers would receive from making the decision to continue a failing R&D 
project will likely be outweighed by the increased perceived need to justify their decisions and 
the desire to maintain a positive reputation in the organization. Impression management can be 
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motivated by the social presence of others whose behaviors individuals are trying to anticipate or 
by the desire to maximize rewards and minimize sanctions. Consistent with self-presentation 
theory, it can be expected that participants in the capitalization condition who have knowledge 
that their supervisors receive restricted stock compensation will be the most concerned about 
pleasing their supervisors and the likelihood of possible negative personal repercussions.  
In the post-experimental questionnaire, participants were asked to rate the importance of 
making a decision to please the CTO and the likelihood that continuing the project would result 
in negative personal repercussions. The responses were measured on an 11-point Likert scale 
anchored at “not important at all” (0) and “very important” (10) and “not likely at all” (0) and 
“very likely” (10), respectively. The mean responses for these questions were 5.05 and 5.65, 
respectively. Similar to the analysis above, two ANOVA models with these questions as the 
dependent variables and R&D reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor 
compensation as the independent variables and planned contrasts were conducted (see Panels C 
through E of Table 6).  
The main effects of R&D reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor 
compensation were not significant (F = 0.05 and 0.79, p = 0.83 and 0.38, respectively) in the 
ANOVA with importance of making a decision to please the CTO as the dependent variable.
7
 
The interaction between R&D reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor 
compensation was significant (F = 4.07, p < 0.05). Again there is the potential that there are 
significant main effects that are masked by the significant interaction. The observed interaction 
results are presented in Panel B of Figure 2. As anticipated, the importance of making a decision 
                                                          
7
 The control group did not receive this question and therefore was excluded from the analyses described in this 
paragraph. 
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that will please the CTO appears to be significantly higher when R&D expenditures are 
capitalized and managers have knowledge that supervisors receive restricted stock compensation. 
Results from the contrast analysis confirm this presumption (F = 1.82, p < 0.10).  
The results from the ANOVA including participants’ perceived likelihood of project 
continuation leading to negative personal repercussions as the dependent variable provides 
slightly different results. In this model, the main effect for managerial knowledge of supervisor 
compensation is significant (F = 2.40, p < 0.10) whereas the main effect for R&D reporting 
method and the interaction term are not (F = .050 and 0.25, p = 0.48 and 0.78, respectively). The 
observed interaction results are presented in Panel C of Figure 2. Participants with knowledge 
that their supervisors receive restricted stock compensation are significantly more concerned 
about the likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method. 
Collectively, these findings suggest self-presentation theory is beneficial for explaining the 
results. 
TABLE 6 
Supplemental Analyses 
 
Panel A: Perceived Personal Responsibility Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)  
           
Source 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
 
Mean 
Square 
 
F-statistic 
 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
METH
a
 
 
3.3 
 
1 
 
3.3 
 
0.75 
 
0.39 
COMP
b
 
 
2.8 
 
2 
 
1.4 
 
0.32 
 
0.72 
METH*COMP 
 
32.0 
 
2 
 
16.0 
 
3.67 
 
0.03 
Error 
 
572.9 
 
132 
 
4.3 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Supplemental Analyses 
 
Panel B: Planned Contrast Test (Personal Responsibility)  
      
Source 
 
t-statistic 
(two-tailed) 
 
p-value 
Contrast 1 (-1, -1, -1, -1, 5, -1) Overall Test:  
 
-2.31 
 
0.02 
 
Expected perceived personal responsibility is lowest when R&D 
expenditures are capitalized and managers have knowledge that 
supervisors receive non-restricted stock compensation. 
     
Panel C: Importance of Making a Decision that Pleases CTO Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Source 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
 
Mean 
Square 
 
F-statistic 
 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
METH
a
 
 
0.4 
 
1 
 
0.4 
 
0.05 
 
0.83 
COMP
b
 
 
5.9 
 
1 
 
5.9 
 
0.79 
 
0.38 
METH*COMP 
 
30.3 
 
1 
 
30.3 
 
4.07 
 
0.05 
Error 
 
662.4 
 
89 
 
7.4 
     
Panel D: Planned Contrast Test (Importance of Making a Decision that Pleases CTO) 
Source 
 
t-statistic 
(two-tailed) 
 
p-value 
Contrast 1 (-1, -1, -1, 3) Overall Test:  
 
1.82 
 
0.07 
 
Expected perceived personal responsibility is lowest 
when R&D expenditures are capitalized and managers 
have knowledge that supervisors receive non-restricted 
stock compensation. 
     
Panel E: Likelihood of Negative Personal Repercussions Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Source 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
 
Mean 
Square 
 
F-
statistic 
 
Two-Tailed 
p-value 
METH
a
 
 
2.4 
 
1 
 
2.4 
 
0.50 
 
0.48 
COMP
b
 
 
23.0 
 
2 
 
11.5 
 
2.40 
 
0.095 
METH*COMP 
 
2.4 
 
2 
 
1.2 
 
0.25 
 
0.78 
Error 
 
632.1 
 
132 
 
4.8 
     
 
a
 METH = R&D reporting method; 1 if R&D expenditures were capitalized; 0 if expensed  
b
 COMP = Managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation; 0 if manager received information that supervisors 
receive non-restricted stock compensation, 1 if manager received information that supervisors receive restricted 
stock compensation, and 3 if the manager did not receive information about supervisor compensation (control)  
 
  
  
47 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Supplemental Analyses 
 
Panel A: R&D Reporting Method by Managerial Knowledge of Supervisor Compensation (Three 
Levels) on Mean Perceived Personal Responsibility 
 
 
 
Panel B: R&D Reporting Method by Managerial Knowledge of Supervisor Compensation (Three 
Levels) on Mean Importance of Making a Decision to Please the CTO 
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FIGURE 2 (continued) 
Supplemental Analyses 
 
Panel C: R&D Reporting Method by Managerial Knowledge of Supervisor Compensation (Three 
Levels) on Mean Perceived Likelihood of Project Continuation Resulting in Negative Personal 
Repercussions 
 
 
 
 
 
V. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation seeks to develop a better understanding of the potential for RM when 
R&D expenditures are capitalized and contributes to the debate on the pros and cons of 
expensing versus capitalizing R&D expenditures. Prior research finds a significant difference in 
RM between R&D expensing and capitalization when managers are personally responsible for 
the original investment decision (Seybert 2010). This study responds to Healy and Wahlen’s 
(1999) call for additional research to provide a better understanding of the factors that contribute 
to and limit earnings management. It also extends the literature on R&D by providing evidence 
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of the potential for RM when R&D expenditures are capitalized in the absence of personal 
responsibility.  
Using salient short-term incentives to motivate RM, this study removes the confounding 
influence of escalation of commitment and demonstrates that capitalization can have 
dysfunctional consequences even when there is no commitment to the project. When managers 
were asked to make an absolute decision to continue or discontinue the original project, 
managers were more likely to continue the project when R&D expenditures were capitalized 
relative to expensed. One implication of this study is that in the presence of economic incentives, 
R&D capitalization may result in managers foregoing economically efficient R&D investment 
opportunities. This in turn suggests that there is the potential for RM in the absence of personal 
responsibility. However, in the absence of an absolute choice the differential impact on project 
continuation between the two R&D reporting methods was less clear. While participants 
indicated that they were more likely to continue the original project and less likely to switch to 
the new project when R&D expenditures were capitalized, the difference in the mean response 
between the two reporting methods was not statistically significant. 
  This dissertation also contributes to understanding the influence of the effects of the 
incentive structure of the manager’s supervisor. Specifically, it attempts to determine whether 
knowledge of an executive’s compensation package will impact the project continuation 
decisions of that individual’s subordinates and if a firm’s R&D reporting method interacts with 
knowledge of executive compensation to impact managerial decisions on R&D project 
continuation. Prior research and theory suggests that there may be both functional and 
dysfunctional effects of capitalizing R&D expenditures that depend upon the incentives of those 
above the decision maker. Building on moral disengagement theory and attribution theory, it was 
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anticipated that knowledge of supervisors receiving short-term, non-restricted stock 
compensation would have a dysfunctional effect (i.e., managers with this knowledge were 
expected to be more likely to engage in RM than managers with no knowledge of supervisor 
compensation).  In contrast, self-presentation theory suggests that knowledge of supervisors 
receiving long-term restricted stock compensation should curb managers’ opportunistic behavior 
(i.e., managers with this knowledge were expected to be less likely to engage in RM than 
managers with no knowledge of supervisor compensation).  
 The results of this study do not support the hypotheses that managerial knowledge of 
supervisor compensation structure influences R&D project continuation choices. However, 
analyses of the debriefing questions provide some meaningful insight into the potential 
psychological effects of managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation in managerial 
decision making. Consistent with attribution theory, when decision makers that capitalized R&D 
expenditures had knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted stock compensation 
their perceived personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. This suggests that 
the presence of an additional beneficiary allows managers to shift some of the responsibility of 
RM away from themselves and onto their supervisors.  
 Participants who capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor 
received restricted, long-term stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to 
please the CTO significantly higher than all other participants. This suggests that knowledge that 
the supervisor’s compensation structure incentivizes long-term earnings amplified managers 
tendencies to make decisions that were in the best long-term interest of the company.  
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Interestingly, participants with knowledge that their supervisors received restricted stock 
compensation were significantly more concerned about the likelihood of negative personal 
repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method. One interpretation of this finding could be 
that compensation with long-term, restricted stock indicates that supervisors will have a more 
long-term orientation and desire what is best for the firm long-term. Continuing a failing project, 
even if it does not impact current year earnings, is not in the best interest of the firm long-term. 
Thus, regardless of R&D reporting method, managers with knowledge that supervisors are 
compensated with restricted stock compensation will have heightened concerns about the 
negative personal repercussions of continuing a failing project. In contrast, non-restricted stock 
compensation implies more of a short-term orientation and does not trigger the same level of 
concern. These findings imply that managerial knowledge of executive compensation may have 
implications for other types of managerial decisions.  
This study employs the rigor of the experimental method to isolate the effects of R&D 
reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation. It would have been 
difficult to isolate the effects of these two variables or to obtain access to data to test the 
hypotheses using archival methods. Thus, an experiment was deemed the most appropriate 
method for studying the research questions proposed in this dissertation. An experimental setting 
also has the benefit of controlling for other individual characteristics that may influence 
managers’ decisions in this context. Additionally, by using an experimental setting it was 
possible to rule out other confounding factors that may be present in the naturally occurring 
archival settings. The controlled environment made possible by using experimental design 
provides a high level of internal validity. However, similar to other experiments, external validity 
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is a limitation of this type of design. Thus, one must use caution when generalizing the results to 
other situations or when assessing the magnitude of the discovered effects in the real world.   
This dissertation is also subject to other limitations. Graduate business students were used 
as a proxy for managers. While the experience and business knowledge of this participant group 
was deemed adequate to achieve the goals of the experiment, differences may exist between the 
student proxies and actual managers. Case materials were developed to be as realistic as possible, 
but experimental realism remains a concern. The task and information presentation may differ or 
be an over-simplification of what would be available to managers in the real world. Additionally, 
participants may not have felt as emotionally committed to the situation as managers who are 
actually faced with making R&D project continuation decisions. Thus, an experiment may not 
adequately reflect what participants would do if they were faced with this situation outside of the 
controlled experimental setting. Finally, participants received hypothetical compensation and so 
it is unclear whether the results would be markedly different if participants received real 
compensation. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this dissertation provides an initial investigation into 
how the compensation structure of executive management changes the R&D decisions of lower 
level managers which provides both interesting insights and potential for future research.  The 
supplemental analyses suggest that managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation influences 
the way managers approach decision making. Examining whether other managerial decisions are 
influenced by knowledge of executive compensation could be a fruitful area for future research. 
This study focuses solely on financial performance measures and incentives. Future research 
could vary the bonus amounts or investigate the role of non-financial performance measures. In 
the current study, discontinuing the project results in a loss when R&D expenditures are 
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capitalized. It would be interesting to investigate whether managers respond differently in a non-
loss scenario. This study could also be extended to include other factors which may affect their 
judgment related to resource allocation such as the relationship between supervisors and 
subordinates, the corporate culture, cultural differences, among others. 
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